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We consider how an elimination tournament's ability to select the most skilled competitor as the winner
is shaped by past, current, and future competition. We present a two-stage model that yields the following
main results: (1) a shadow effect — the weaker the expected future competitor, the greater the probability
that the stronger player wins in the current stage and (2) an effort spillover effect — previous effort
reduces the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage. We test our theory predictions
using data from high-stakes tournaments and betting markets. Empirical results suggest that shadow
and spillover effects influence match outcomes.
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d-minor@kellogg.northwestern.eduCompetition for employment and education, innovation funding, and design opportuni-
ties can all be framed as multi-stage elimination tournaments in which players are knocked
out over successive stages of the event. These contests are often designed to increase player
eﬀort–indeed, much of the theoretical and empirical literature focuses on contests as incen-
tive mechanisms. Yet, tournaments may also serve as selection mechanisms, identifying the
“best” candidates as overall winners. In labor tournaments where employees’ latent talents
are not directly observable, ﬁrms may organize contests to reveal their workers’ relative abil-
ities.1 For example, in searching for a CEO, a ﬁrm may use a tournament to identify and
promote the highest-ability candidate, not simply the one who puts forth the most eﬀort.
In this paper, we study how the strategies of heterogeneous players in match-pair elimi-
nation tournaments are shaped by past, current, and future competition. More speciﬁcally,
we examine how these intertemporal eﬀects inﬂuence a tournament’s ability to reveal the
strongest player as the winner. Negative spillover from past stages may make current eﬀort
more costly and depress performance, while the shadow of tough future competition decreases
a player’s expected future payoﬀs and also may lead to lower current eﬀort. The diﬀerential
impact of past and future competition across players in a given match changes the eﬀec-
tiveness of tournaments as a selection mechanism–both negative spillover and tough future
competition increase the probability that a weak candidate wins overall. Our results have
practical implications; whether the contest aims to encourage eﬀort, select a strong winner,
or both, we ﬁnd evidence suggesting that ﬁrms, educators, and other contest designers may
need to consider the role of past and future competition in structuring incentives.
In personnel tournaments, workers risk elimination as they advance through corporate
management levels. In most contexts, retention of the highest quality worker is most desir-
able. For example, GE’s former CEO, Jack Welch, designed an explicit elimination tourna-
ment to select his successor (Konrad 2009).2
Competition between ﬁrms may also be knockout events. In 2010, GE announced a three-
stage elimination tournament, the Ecomagination Challenge, to award $200 million to the
ﬁrm that developed the best smart grid technologies. More commonly, architectural ﬁrms
may compete for large contracts and investment banks may compete for new clients over
several stages of proposals and commitments. Political races also may involve elimination
stages–a candidate must win his party’s primary election to compete in the general election
to hold oﬃce. Many sporting events are also structured as elimination tournaments.
1In contrast, Lazear (1986) discusses how performance pay may attract higher quality workers into the
ﬁrm when the ﬁrm cannot readily observe innate worker ability.
2Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2009) discuss the growing importance of performance pay.
1In each of these examples, eﬀort is clearly important; ﬁrms want to hire designers, bankers
and innovators who will invest heavily in the activity at hand, voters want their represen-
tatives to work hard on their behalf, and spectators enjoy high action games. However,
selection may also be a prime objective of the contest organizer–a client may desire the
most creative design ﬁrm, voters may value the most skilled politician, and a board may
want the smartest executive to lead the company.
We explore elimination tournaments as selection mechanisms with a two-stage match-
pair model. Our analysis yields two main results: First, we identify a shadow eﬀect of
future competition–the weaker the expected competitor in the next stage, the greater the
probability that the stronger player wins in the current match. Second, we ﬁnd an eﬀort
spillover eﬀect–with negative spillover, eﬀort in earlier stages lowers the probability that
the stronger player wins. We also ﬁnd that noise around eﬀort and a ﬂatter prize structure
reduce the probability that the stronger player wins. Finally, our analysis of an underdog
advantage broadly rationalizes the conﬂicting ﬁndings in the existing literature.
One particular strength of our model is that its predictions are framed in terms of
outcomes–eﬀort alone is notoriously diﬃcult to measure in the ﬁeld. We test our theoretical
predictions using the outcomes of high-stakes matches; we exploit the random assignment
of players in professional tennis tournament draws. Examining the eﬀect of changes in the
skill of the expected competitor in the next round, we ﬁnd evidence of a shadow eﬀect in
all but the last rounds of play. Spillover in tennis tournaments appears to have a negative
impact on the probability of winning, particularly for the stronger player. We also exam-
ine tennis betting markets and ﬁnd that bookmakers’ prices reﬂect both spillover from past
competition and the shadow of future opponents.
In early work on knock-out tournaments, Rosen (1986) models a multi-stage contest
where players have Tullock-style contest success functions. Rosen’s main result explains
the skewed compensation distributions found in many ﬁrms–extra rewards are required in
late stages of these elimination tournaments to maintain equal levels of eﬀort across stages.
Harbaugh and Klumpp (2005) study a special case of Rosen’s model with a single prize and
where the total supply of eﬀort is ﬁxed across two periods and equal for all players. Because
eﬀort is costless in their model, players exhaust all of their remaining eﬀort in the ﬁnal
period. As a result, the weaker player always exert more eﬀort than the stronger player in
the ﬁrst stage–the stronger player conserves his eﬀort in anticipation of stiﬀ competition in
a ﬁnal stage match against an equally skilled opponent. In this context, “spillover” between
stages disadvantages the low-skill players in the ﬁnal round.
Searls (1963) compares the statistical properties of single- and double-elimination contests
and predicts that single-elimination events are most likely to select the highest ability player
2as the winner. Groh et al. (2008) describe the optimal seeding of heterogeneous players
according to the contest designer’s objective. Modeling contests as all-pay auctions, they
ﬁnd that common seeding rules that match weakest to strongest players in the semiﬁnals
maximize the probability that the strongest player wins overall.
Ryvkin (2009) considers the elasticities of a player’s equilibrium eﬀort with respect to
his own ability and the abilities of his opponents across several tournament formats. In
elimination tournaments with weakly heterogeneous players, he ﬁnds that the abilities of
opponents in the more distant future have a lower impact on a player’s equilibrium eﬀort
than does the ability of the current opponent. Ryvkin also shows that, when players’ relative
abilities are uniformly distributed, a “balanced” seeding can eliminate the dependence of a
player’s equilibrium eﬀort on his opponents’ abilities.
Our eﬀort spillover prediction relates to previous work on fatigue in dynamic competition.
Ryvkin (2011) presents a winner-take-all model where homogeneous players face a binary
eﬀort decision and eﬀort has no explicit cost–these features are in stark contrast to our
model where player are heterogeneous and eﬀort is a continuous and costly choice variable in
am u l t i - p r i z et o u r n a m e n t .I nh i sw o r k ,f a t i g u ea c c u m u l a t e sa c r o s ss t a g e sa n dp l a y e r sh a v en o
opportunity to refresh their eﬀort resources. Among other results, he ﬁnds that equilibrium
eﬀort is decreasing in fatigue. Our contribution complements and extend his theoretical and
experimental fatigue result to a more ﬂexible and descriptive context. Moreover, we consider
explicitly–theoretically and in the ﬁeld–the interaction between negative spillover from the
past and the shadow of expected future competition.
Sunde (2009) tests the incentive eﬀect of player heterogeneity using data from selected
professional tennis tournaments. He ﬁnds that heterogeneity impacts the eﬀo r tc h o i c eo f
t h es t r o n g e rp l a y e rm o r et h a ni tc h a n g e st h ee ﬀort of the weaker player in a match. In
his analysis, this means that the weaker player wins fewer games per set and the stronger
player wins more games per set as heterogeneity increases. However, these eﬀects are not
symmetric: for an equal change in rank disparity, the increase in the number of games won
by the stronger player is smaller than the decrease in the number of games lost by the weaker
player. In contrast to Sunde’s work, we study the role of skill heterogeneity across multiple
stages of an event–that is, we examine the incentive impact of ability diﬀerences with past,
current, and (expected) future opponents. The eﬀects of player heterogeneity on eﬀort in
one-shot tournaments has been studied both theoretically (e.g. Baik, 1994; Moldovanu and
Sela, 2001; Szymanski and Valletti, 2005; Minor, 2011) and empirically (e.g. Knoeber and
Thurman, 1994; Brown, forthcoming).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents a two-stage model of an elimination
tournament. We derive several propositions and outline the testable hypotheses. In Section
32, we describe our data and empirical strategy for testing these predictions. Section 3
describes the results and Section 4 discusses the spillover and shadow eﬀects in the context
of betting markets. We conclude in Section 5 and discuss the implications of our ﬁndings
for contest designers.
1T h e o r y
We study a new theoretical version of knockout tournaments that we describe as “sequentially-
resolved elimination tournaments.” Matches in each stage are staggered across time; within
a stage, players in later matches learn the identity of their potential future opponent from
outcomes of earlier matches. Sequential play is often found in practice; for example, in ﬁrm-
level tournaments, simultaneous promotions to division vice-president may be rare. Instead,
the identity of the new appointee is known to other workers still competing for a parallel ex-
ecutive spot–the hopeful workers now know their future opponent for advancement beyond
vice-president. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to consider such a format theoretically.
We use an additive noise model, as in Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) foundational work on
one-shot labor tournaments, to focus on the dynamics of a multi-stage elimination tourna-
ment. This structure is in contrast with other models of elimination tournaments where all
matches in a given stage occur simultaneously (for example, see Stracke (2011)) and the
contest success function takes on a Tullock form (see Rosen (1986)).3
In the following section, we explore the role of past and future competition on tournament
outcomes. We present a model that is simple enough to clearly inform our empirical tests, yet
rich enough to capture common features of high-stakes, multi-stage tournaments. Namely, we
model an elimination tournament with heterogeneously skilled players competing in sustained
competition–one could imagine professionals of varying abilities competing over months or
years for a prized position within the ﬁrm.4 In the main text, we consider these spillover
and shadow eﬀects separately for expositional ease; however, in the appendix, we present an
analysis of the eﬀects operating simultaneously. Combining the eﬀects does not change the
general predictions of the model.
Our theory results describe the probability that the stronger player wins in diﬀerent
stages of the elimination event. These predictions speak directly to our broader research
question of “selecting the best.” That is, our comparative statics results provide predictions
about when the strongest player is most likely to advance to future rounds of competition
3Unlike the Tullock model where competitors exert the equal eﬀort in the ﬁnal stage regardless of their
relative abilities, the additive noise model allows for heterogeneous eﬀorts in all stages.
4In a sports context, our model better reﬂects the dynamics of an endurance event (e.g. tennis) than
competition requiring a short burst of eﬀort (e.g. power lifting).
4and, ultimately, win the tournament.
1.1 Model Set-Up
Consider a two-stage elimination tournament with four players, where the players who win
in the ﬁrst stage advance to the ﬁnal stage. The overall tournament winner receives a prize
of  while the second-place competitor receives a prize .L e t    0 and deﬁne
the prize spread ∆ =  −  Let player ’s total cost be a function of his eﬀort  and
his cost type 5 We denote player ’s costs as  (),w h e r e0 ()  0, 0 (0) = 0 and
00 ()  0 We assume that cost types, , vary across all players and are commonly known
amongst competitors.
For ease of exposition, we model heterogeneity through players’ cost types. However,
several alternative models produce identical results: for example, if we instead capture het-
erogeneity across valuations by deﬁning a player’s prize value as 
 or by allowing the impact
of an additional unit of eﬀort on a player’s probability of winning to vary across competitors.
It can also be shown that capturing heterogeneity by varying cost function convexity leads
to similar results.
Recall that matches in the ﬁrst-stage are sequential. Assume that players 3 and 4 compete
ﬁrst. Then, player 1 faces player 2 knowing the outcome of the previous match. Without
loss of generality, we assume that player 3 won his match against player 4.
1.1.1 Final Stage
Assume that player 1 won his ﬁrst-stage match. To ﬁnd the equilibrium of the multi-stage
game, we begin by analyzing the strategies of player 1 and his opponent player 3 in the ﬁnal
stage. Deﬁne player 1’s expected payoﬀ function as
1 = 1 (1 3)∆ − 1 (1)+ (1)





1 if 1 + 1  3 + 3
1
2 if 1 + 1 = 3 + 3
0 otherwise
(2)
5One could deﬁne a mapping  : R
+ → R1
+ that collapses levels of  eﬀort-generating activities to the
real line. The overall cost of eﬀort is then strictly increasing in the resultant scalar .
5where + is player ’s level of output. Output is a function of both eﬀort  and a random
noise term  In deﬁnition (2) the probability that player 1 wins is increasing in his own
eﬀort and decreasing in the eﬀort of his opponent.
Deﬁne  = 3 − 1 and let  be distributed according to some distribution  such that
probability (2) can be written as
1 (1 3)=1 (1 − 3  )=(1 − 3) (3)
Now, player 1’s payoﬀ function (1) c a nb ew r i t t e na s
1 = (1 − 3)∆ − 1 (1)+ (4)




0 (1 − 3)∆ − 1
0 (1)=0 (5)
Following Konrad (2009) and Ederer (2010), we assume that  is distributed uniformly
















The assumption that  is uniformly distributed removes the strategic interdependence
of players’ current period eﬀort choices (Konrad, 2009). This allows us to isolate the conse-
quences of past eﬀort choices and potential future competition on current-stage eﬀort. In a
ﬁrm context, this would assume that a worker’s optimal eﬀort choice is independent of the
identity of his current opponent; of course, in earlier stages, his optimal eﬀort depends on his
expectations about future opponents’ identities. In the Appendix, we relax this assumption
of same-stage independence and allow players’ optimal eﬀort choices to depend on both their
current and future opponents. We show that the general predictions of the model continue
to hold with more general distributions that allow for same-stage interdependence, including
the normal distribution.








6See the Appendix for conditions on the primitives of the model that assure that  is well-deﬁned.





for  =1 3 (6)
Assume for the remainder of the analysis that player 1 is the stronger player (1  3) Then,
expression (6) implies player 1 exerts more equilibrium eﬀort in the ﬁnal stage (∗
1  ∗
3)This
inequality implies that the stronger player is more likely to win in the ﬁnal stage, relatively
to his weaker opponent–that is, the better player is more likely to be “selected” as the
overall tournament winner.
In the ﬁnal round, since both players are guaranteed at least the second prize  in-
creasing the ﬁrst prize amounts to increasing the stakes of the contest. As expected, higher
stakes leads to more eﬀort from both players, though the stronger player increases his eﬀort
more than the weaker player. Also, increasing the noise around eﬀort (i.e., increasing  the
width of the support of ) reduces equilibrium eﬀort, particularly for the stronger player.
Finally, as expected, eﬀort choices are increasing in ability.
1.1.2 First Stage
Deﬁne 1 and 2 as the eﬀorts of players 1 and 2 in the ﬁrst stage. Player 1’s expected payoﬀ
function in the ﬁrst stage is
1 = 1 (1 2) ˜ 1 − 1 (1) (7)
where ˜ 1 is his continuation value (i.e., his payoﬀ in the ﬁnal stage):


















for  =1 2 (8)
As in the ﬁnal stage, equilibrium eﬀort is increasing in ability and the continuation value.
Increasing the noise around eﬀort has an adverse eﬀect on ﬁrst stage eﬀort.
Recall that, at the start of their match, players 1 and 2 already know the outcome of the
7other ﬁrst-stage match between players 3 and 4. Of course, this means that players 3 and
4 did not know exactly the identity of their future opponent. Instead, we assume that they
















2) for  =3 4
where 1| is the equilibrium probability that player 1 wins knowing that he will face player
 in the ﬁnal stage.7 Note that player  cannot inﬂuence this probability 1| b e c a u s ei ti s
a function of the realized outcome of the completed match between players 3 and 4. This
simpliﬁes our analysis because player ’s ﬁrst-stage eﬀort  does not change this probability









for  =3 4
and the analysis described above for players 1 and 2 applies similarly.
1.2 Shadow of Future Competition
We can use the model to understand the impact of known or expected future competition
on the likelihood that strong players advance to future stages of the tournament–of course,
this inﬂuences the likelihood that a high-skill player is selected as the overall winner.
Consider a decrease in the skill of the future opponent, player 3 (i.e. 3 increases). This
change has the eﬀect of increasing the continuation value for both players 1 and 2 in the
ﬁrst stage. Since player 1 has a lower cost of eﬀort than player 2, player 1 will increase his
ﬁrst-stage eﬀo r tm o r et h a np l a y e r2b e c a u s eh i sr e t u r nt oac h a n g ei nt h ec o n t i n u a t i o nv a l u e
is greater.
From the ﬁnal-stage ﬁrst order condition, equation (6) it follows that ∗
3 decreases as 3
increases. To understand the eﬀect of decreasing ∗
3 on the ﬁnal stage payoﬀ 1we take














That is, as the ﬁnal stage opponent’s eﬀort decreases, the player 1’s ﬁnal stage equilibrium

















 ˜  (∗
 ∗
2) for  =3 4
8Since the change in the continuation value is the same for players 1 and 2, the stronger
player will increase his eﬀort (∗
1) more than player 2 will increase his eﬀort (∗
2)To see this,
add a term  to represent the (equal) change in the continuation value to equation (8):

0 ()=
˜  + 








 We require that both players’ eﬀort choices are suﬃciently sensitive
to a change in marginal beneﬁt–players must be able to scale up their current equilibrium





1 This condition on the slope of the marginal cost curve insures that the stronger
player is suﬃciently sensitive to a change in marginal beneﬁt induced by a weaker future
opponent; this further improves the stronger player’s probability of winning in the ﬁrst stage.
F o re x a m p l e ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h i si n e q u a l i t yi ss a t i s ﬁed with all cost functions of the
form  where 1 More generally, a suﬃcient but slack condition for the inequality is
000 ≤ 08 Note that cost functions of the form  with 2 fail to satisfy 000 ≤ 0 but still







This analysis gives us the following proposition:





1, as the skill of the future competitor in the ﬁnal
stage declines (increases), the stronger player becomes even more (less) likely to win in the
ﬁrst stage and thus more (less) likely to be selected as the overall tournament winner.
1.3 Eﬀort Spillover
We can also examine eﬀort spillover between stages of the tournament. Spillover can take
either a positive or negative form. Positive spillover might reﬂect learning (by doing), skill
building or momentum within a ﬁrm. For example, an innovation team whose proposal
advances to a second stage of funding might beneﬁtf r o mi t sﬁrst-stage experience, both
technical and relational. With positive spillover, second-stage eﬀort is less costly than ﬁrst
stage eﬀort. In contrast, negative spillover might reﬂect fatigue or reduced resources in
later stages. For example, architects competing in design competitions might exhaust their
creative resources in early stages and have only limited energy for second-stage proposals.
In this case, second-stage eﬀort is more costly than ﬁrst-stage eﬀort.9
8Ederer (2010) discusses models where the results instead depend critically on the sign of 000
9Diﬀerent notions of spillover have been explored in the literature in settings where players with exoge-
nous, ﬁxed resources make eﬀort allocation decisions over multiple periods of play. For recent examples, see
Sela and Erez (2011) and Harbaugh and Klumpp (2005).
9Consider a scenario where eﬀort expended by a player in the ﬁrst stage inﬂuences his
eﬀort in the ﬁnal stage. We can rewrite player 1’s ﬁnal-stage payoﬀ as
1 = (1 − 3)∆ − 1 (1 1)+
where the cost function reﬂects current and past eﬀort.
First, consider the case where a player’s marginal cost of eﬀort in the ﬁnal stage is
unaﬀected by previous stage eﬀort:
(11)
11 =0  If previous eﬀort appears only as a ﬁxed
cost in the ﬁnal stage, we would expect no change in ﬁnal-stage eﬀort. For example, a
design team that submits an innovative proposal in the ﬁrst stage might require specialized
equipment to complete the building phase in the second stage.
To study a negative spillover eﬀect, we let a player’s marginal cost of eﬀort in the ﬁnal
s t a g eb ei n c r e a s i n gi nﬁrst-stage eﬀort:
(11)
11  0. Consider again expression (6)We
see that ﬁnal stage equilibrium eﬀort is strictly decreasing in ﬁrst stage eﬀort because the
marginal cost of ﬁnal-stage eﬀo r ti si n c r e a s i n gi nﬁrst-stage eﬀort. With positive spillover, a
player’s marginal cost of eﬀort in the ﬁnal stage is decreasing in ﬁrst-stage eﬀort:
(11)
11  0.
Now, from expression (6), ﬁnal-stage equilibrium eﬀort is strictly increasing in ﬁrst-stage
eﬀort.
We can re-write player 1’s marginal cost of eﬀort with spillover as 0 (1 1)=0 (10)
where 1 for net negative spillover and 1 for net positive spillover. Revisiting
expression (6)we can rewrite marginal cost as
0 (1) = ∆
1 or 0 (1)=∆
˜ 1 (9)
where ˜ 1 = 1 Straightforward calculations show that
1
1  0. Therefore, when ˜ 1  1
ﬁnal period proﬁt ˜ 1 is less than when there is no eﬀort spillover. Conversely, when ˜ 1  1
ﬁnal period proﬁt ˜ 1 is greater than when there is no spillover.
The presence of the negative (positive) spillover also reduces (increases) ﬁrst-stage eﬀort;
in expression (8) lower (higher) ˜ 1 leads to lower (higher) eﬀort.
Since negative spillover decreases ﬁnal-stage equilibrium eﬀort, an increase in ﬁrst-stage
eﬀort implies a lower probability of success in the ﬁnal stage, holding the opponent’s eﬀort
and skill constant. Of course, the opposite is true for positive spillover. On net, when both
players in a match suﬀer negative spillover, the increase in eﬀort costs in the current stage
reduces the probability that the stronger player wins. The direction and impact of spillover
depends on the context and, thus, is an empirical question.
As seen in expressions (9) an increase in noise  has a similar impact to an increase
in negative spillover. That is, an increase in the noise of the eﬀort-to-output relationship
10reduces the disparity between players’ eﬀorts, reducing the probability that the stronger
player wins. We collect these ﬁndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In any stage, a common proportional increase in eﬀective cost type or an
increase in noise decreases the probability that the stronger player is selected as the winner.
That is, when player ’s eﬀective cost type is , (∗
1 − ∗
2) → 05 and (∗
1 − ∗
3) → 05
as the degree of negative spillover  →∞or the noise parameter  →∞ 
Proof. From expressions (6) and (8)we can see that as cost types converge to inﬁnity,
eﬀort becomes so costly that no eﬀort is exerted. Thus, the stronger player should fare
worse in events that are proportionally more costly for all players in every round. With
increased noise, a similar logic applies–as the support of  goes to inﬁnity, equilibrium
eﬀort converges to zero–the marginal return to eﬀort declines. In the limit, eﬀort has no
impact on a player’s probability of success and, therefore, no eﬀort is exerted.
This proposition suggests that, with negative spillover, weaker players might support
costlier competitive conditions–for example, a weaker player might advocate for more strin-
gent common standards or more diﬃcult tasks.
Our result that negative spillover levels the playing ﬁeld in both stages is in contrast to
Harbaugh and Klumpp’s (2005) ﬁnding that intertemporal tradeoﬀs level the playing ﬁeld
for the ﬁrst stage but do the opposite eﬀect in the ﬁnal stage. Their result is sensitive to the
assumptions that eﬀort is costless and that players’ total eﬀorts are equally constrained.
1.4 Prize Eﬀect
We can explore how changes in the prize structure aﬀect equilibrium eﬀort choice and tour-
nament outcomes. In particular, we study the eﬀect of increasing the spread, ∆ between
ﬁrst and second prize. To simplify our exposition, we assume that participants’ costs are
quadratic and hold constant the skill level of players in each stage.
1.4.1 Prize Eﬀect - Final Stage






Since 1  2 increasing ∆ increases the eﬀort of the stronger player more than for the
weaker player. That is, the eﬀort disparity between players increases as the relative stakes
increase.
111.4.2 Prize Eﬀe c t-F i r s ts t a g e
F r o mo u ra n a l y s i sa b o v e ,w ec a nw r i t eo u tp l a y e r’s continuation value when he faces































































This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 With quadratic costs, for a given prize spread increase, the stronger player
is even more likely to be selected as the winner in either stage.
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
This proposition suggests that tournaments with steeper prize structures will more often
lead to the success and selection of the most able player.
1.5 Underdog Advantage
Now, we can compare the diﬀerence in eﬀort choices between the stronger and weaker player
across stages to determine diﬀerences in their probabilities of winning, holding ﬁxed the
skill diﬀerential between players. For example, we can compare the outcome of a ﬁnal-stage
match between players of cost types 1 and 3 with the outcome of a ﬁrst-stage match between
players of these same cost types.
Assume that a player of cost type 1 is stronger than a player of cost type 3 (1  3) As
long as the ﬁnal-stage losing prize  is large enough relative to ∆ then eﬀort disparity




3.S i n c ee ﬀort disparity is greater in the ﬁrst stage
than in the ﬁnal stage, expression (3) necessarily means that the stronger player has a greater
probability of winning in the ﬁrst stage relative to the ﬁnal stage. That is, when certain
prize conditions are satisﬁed, the weaker player has a lesser probability of losing against
a stronger player in the ﬁnal stage relative to his probability of losing against that same
opponent in the ﬁrst stage of an otherwise identical tournament. The intuition is as follows:
As we increase the losing prize  while holding prize spread ∆ constant, the diﬀerence in
ﬁrst-stage eﬀorts (∗
1 − ∗
3) increases because the stronger player is more sensitive to changes
in the continuation value. In contrast, the diﬀerence in ﬁnal stage eﬀorts (∗
1 − ∗
3) remains
the same, since the losing prize does not enter the ﬁrst order condition for the ﬁnal stage.
While the contest success functions are not directly comparable, this result broadly cap-
tures conﬂicting ﬁndings in the existing literature: While Rosen (1986) ﬁnds that there is
always an “underdog advantage” in his Tullock-style contest with multiple prizes, Harbaugh
and Klumpp (2005) ﬁnd the opposite is true in winner-take-all contests when the supply of
eﬀort is ﬁxed and unused eﬀort is valueless.10 We ﬁnd that the presence or absence of the
underdog advantage will depend critically on the relative sizes of the ﬁrst- and second-prizes.
This leads to our fourth proposition:
Proposition 4 1 (∗
1 ∗
3 (3))  1 (∗
1∗








 W i t has u ﬃc i e n t l yl a r g es e c o n dp l a c ep r i z er e l a t i v et ot h eﬁrst place prize,
the probability that the weaker player wins in the ﬁnal stage (and thus is selected as the
overall tournament winner) is greater than the probability that he wins in the ﬁrst stage,
holding opponent skill constant.
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
1.6 Model Predictions
The theory model outlined above provides the following main predictions:
1. Shadow of Future Competitors: The worse-ranked the expected competitor in the
next stage, the greater the probability that the stronger player is selected as the winner
in the current stage.
2. Eﬀort Spillover between Stages: In equilibrium, increased negative (positive)
spillover decreases (increases) the probability that the stronger player is selected as
the winner in the ﬁnal stage.
10Harbaugh and Klumpp’s “underdog disadvantage” is reduced (and, in the limit, eliminated) by the
introduction of a suﬃciently large second prize.
13We also explore some additional comparative static results:
Noise in Eﬀort: The noisier the eﬀort-to-output relationship, the lower the probability
that the stronger player wins in either stage.
Prize Spread: A steeper prize structure improves the stronger player’s probability of
success in all stages.
Underdog Advantage in Final Stage: Fixing the competitors’ abilities and given a
suﬃciently large (small) second-place prize, the probability of winning is greater (smaller)
for the weaker player in the ﬁn a ls t a g e ,r e l a t i v et ot h eﬁrst stage.
One strength of this particular model is that, while these hypotheses emerge from dif-
ferences in the abilities and eﬀorts of players, the testable implications can be framed in
terms of outcomes. This means that although eﬀort is notoriously diﬃcult to assess in ﬁeld
data, we can test the two main predictions of the model by observing tournament outcomes.
That is, we can identify readily whether changes in the strength of future competition or
the degree of negative spillover impacts whether the most able competitor is selected as the
tournament winner. In the following sections, we describe our data and empirical analysis.
2D a t a
Professional tennis oﬀers an ideal environment in which to test the empirical implications
of the theory.11 Tennis events are single-elimination tournaments–only winning players
advance to successive stages until two players meet in the ﬁnal stage to determine the overall
winner. Prizes increase across stages with the largest prize going to the overall winner.
The distribution of prizes is known in advance of all tournaments. The ﬁnancial stakes are
substantial and vary across events–for example, the total purse for the 2009 US Open singles
competition was $16 million with a $1.7 million prize for ﬁrst place, while the total purse
for the 2009 SAP Open was $531,000 and the winner received $90,925.
Our empirical analysis exploits the random nature of the initial tournament draw. By
ATP rules, the top 20 to 25% of players in an event (the “seeds”) are distributed across the
draw: the top two seeds are placed on opposite ends of the draw; the next two seeds are
randomly assigned to interior slots on the draw; the next four seeds are randomly assigned to
other slots; etc. After the seeded players have been assigned, the remaining players are then
randomly placed to matches prior to the start of the event.12 This variation provides the
11While tennis tournament organizers may various objections beyond selection, it is the structure of these
tournaments that lends itself to our empirical tests. That is, one would expect tournament competitors to
respond to the structure and incentives, not the reason for that contest design
12Note that the seeding is done according to rank within a tournament; the top seed in one event may
have a diﬀerent skill level than the top seed in another tournament.
14identiﬁcation for our empirical approach–we can observe the same skilled player compete
against a variety of randomly-assigned opponents. For example, in our data, we can observe
the fourth best player in the world play against competitors ranked 50,1 0 0 ,a n d2 5 0  in
the ﬁrst round of similar tournaments in a single year.
The structure of tennis tournaments is particularly conducive to studying the shadow
of future competition–both players (and the econometrician) know the competitors in the
parallel match. In some cases, players know exactly who they would face in the next round;
in other cases, they can make reasonable predictions about upcoming opponents. Moreover,
player ability is also observable to players and researchers–past performance, as well as
world rankings statistics, are widely available. Figure 1 presents the draw from the 2007
Swiss Indoors tournament in Basel. In the ﬁrst round, Del Potro and Russell knew that
their next opponent would be either Federer or Berrer. Of course, given the ability diﬀerence
between these possible future opponents, Del Potro and Russell were likely predicting that
their second-round opponent would be Federer.
Data from professional tennis has been used in other research: Walker and Wooders
(2001) used video footage and data from the ﬁnals of 10 Grand Slam events to identify mixed
strategies. Malueg and Yates (2010) study best-of-three contests using four years of data
from professional tennis matches with evenly-skilled opponents. They ﬁnd that the winner of
the ﬁrst set of a match tends to exert more eﬀort in the second set than does the loser and, in
the event of a third set, players exert equal eﬀort. Forrest and McHale (2007) use professional
tennis tour and bookmaking data and ﬁnd a modest long-shot bias. Gonzalez-Diaz et al.
(2010) use data from US Open tournaments to assess individual players’ abilities to adjust
their performance depending on the importance of the competitive situation. They ﬁnd that
heterogeneity in this ability drives diﬀerences in players’ long-term success. Using detailed
data from the men’s and women’s professional tennis circuits, Gilsdorf and Sukhatme (2008a
and 2008b) ﬁnd that larger marginal prizes increase the probability that the stronger player
wins.
2.1 Professional Tennis Match Data
To test the predictions outlined in the theory, we examine the behavior of professional tennis
players in 615 international tournaments on the ATP World Tour between January 2001
and June 2010. The data include game-level scores and player attributes for men’s singles
matches (available at http://www.tennis-data.co.uk). The four “Grand Slam” events–the
Australian, French, and US Opens, and Wimbledon–are included in the data. All of the
tournaments are multi-round, single-elimination events played over several days.
15Tournament draws may include 28, 32, 48, 56, 96 or 128 players. Of the 615 events in the
data, 433 tournaments consist of ﬁve rounds of play–rounds 1 and 2, quarterﬁnals, semiﬁ-
nals, and the ﬁnal. Six rounds are played in 128 events. Fifty-four tournaments, including
the Grand Slam events, consist of seven rounds of play–rounds 1 to 4, quarterﬁnals, semi-
ﬁnals, and the ﬁnal. Most ATP events are best-of-three sets, while the Grand Slam events
are best-of-ﬁve sets.13 Figure 1 is a typical draw for a ﬁve-round, 32-player tournament. De-
pending on the number of competitors, ﬁrst-round byes may be awarded to the top-ranked
players.14
World rankings (oﬃcially called the South African Airways ATP Rankings) are based on
points that players accumulate over the previous 12 months. The ATP points directly reﬂect
t h ep y r a m i ds t r u c t u r eo ft o u r n a m e n t s .M o r ep oints are awarded to players who advance in
top tournaments; for example, a Grand Slam winners earns the maximum points awarded for
as i n g l ee v e n t . 15 ATP rankings are simply a rank-order of all players by their accumulated
points. In our analysis, we use the ATP rankings to account for players’ skill levels.16
Table 1 presents summary statistics from over 28,000 men’s professional tennis matches.
On average, matches are decided after 23 games; however, players play more games on average
in the ﬁnal round than in the ﬁrst or semiﬁnal rounds (p-value 001). Match winners are
signiﬁcantly more skilled than losers (p-value 001). Tournament winners typically rank
30th in the world, while second-place ﬁnishers are 45th in the rankings. Tournaments’
seeding formats generally pair the weakest players against the strongest players in the ﬁrst
round. Consequently, the disparity in rankings decreases as players advance. To consider
the competitive balance of matches across rounds, we also report the rankings ratio (worse
rank divided by better rank). While mean rankings ratios remain relatively stable across
rounds, the variance appears to decline. The skill-related summary statistics suggest that
while high-skill players do not always win their matches, on average, opponents become
closer in ability as tournaments progress.
13To win a set, a player must win at least six games and at least two games more than his opponent.
A game is won by the player who wins at least four points and at least two more than his opponent. Set
tie-break rules vary by tournament.
14Byes automatically advance a player to the next round.
15For details of the world ranking system, see the 2011 ATP World Tour Rulebook, available online at
www.atpworldtour.com.
16Klaassen and Magnus (2003) suggest a transformation of rankings to account for diﬀerences in ability
between high- and low-skilled players. They calculate a player’s ability as  = +1−log2 ()where
 is the total number of rounds in the tournament and  is the player’s tournament seed. All of
our analyses are robust to this alternative measure of skill heterogeneity–results with the Klaassen-Magnus
transformation are qualitatively very similar to the results using ATP rankings and are not reported.
163R e s u l t s
In this section, we present empirical tests of the theoretical predictions. We ﬁrst examine
performance data from professional tennis matches, presenting empirical results supporting
both spillover and shadow eﬀects. We then report additional evidence relating to the model’s
predictions about an underdog advantage. In Section (4), we ask whether shadow and
spillover eﬀects have been priced into betting markets. Although this additional analysis
is not a direct test of the theory, it does provide further support for the importance of
understanding these phenomena.
3.1 Spillover and Shadow Eﬀects
Proposition 1 states that weaker future competition will increase the stronger competitor’s
probability of success in the current stage, thus increasing the probability that the tourna-
ment selects the best player as the winner. This prediction follows from the observation
that, while weaker future competition will cause both players to increase their eﬀort in the
current period, the current eﬀort of the better-ranked player increases even more than the
current eﬀort of his worse-ranked opponent. Proposition 2 considers the role of spillover in
eﬀort choice. The direction of the spillover eﬀect is often an empirical question; however,
one might expect negative spillover in events that require intense eﬀort exertion over a short
period of time. In professional tennis, players may face a higher cost of eﬀort if their total
exertion in previous matches induced lasting fatigue.
The following speciﬁcation allows us to study the eﬀects of shadow and spillover simul-
taneously:
 = 0 + 1  + 2 (10)
+ 3 + 4 +  + 
where  is a binary indicator of whether the better-ranked player in match 
won in a stated round of tournament ,   represents the expected ability of the
opponent in the next round,  represents the heterogeneity of players’ skills in the
current match,  is the number of games played in all previous rounds of the
tournament by the better-ranked player,  is the number of games played in all
previous rounds of the tournament by the worse-ranked player,  is a matrix of tournament-
level controls, and  is the error term. We estimate all equations using OLS with a robust
variance estimator; results are quantitatively very similar for a probit speciﬁcation and are
not reported.
17In the reported regression,  i st h er a t i oo ft h er a n ko ft h ew o r s ep l a y e ra n d
the better player.   is the rank associated with the stronger player in the parallel
match. For example, for the 2007 Swiss Indoorst o u r n a m e n t( s e eF i g u r e1 ) ,t h ee x p e c t e d
future opponent for the match between Del Potro and Russell would be Federer. For the
Del Potro-Russell match,  = 71
49 and   =1 .N o t et h a tt h i sc o n s t r u c t i o no f
 is a conservative one–we are assuming that the future competitor will always be
the better of the two potential opponents in the next round. This means that, on average,
we are understating the continuation value for players in the current round. Consequently,
our coeﬃcient estimates on  will understate the actual shadow eﬀect.17 Results are
qualitatively similar if we instead use an average of future opponents’ rankings.
Tournament-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects capture average event-level characteristics and control
for diﬀerences between tournaments (e.g. media attention). Total purse size for any given
event has not varied substantially across time. For example, the purse for the US Open has
grown by an average of 3% each year from 1997 to 2011. Over the same period, the inﬂation
rate was roughly the same. Therefore, real purse size was relatively stable and the purse
eﬀect is captured by tournament dummies. Additionally, because some tournaments have
changed venues over time, we include additional controls for surface and court type.
Results: Table 2
Table 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients for regression (10) by tournament round.18 The
round-by-round analysis overcomes the confounding inﬂuence of changes in marginal prizes
across rounds within a tournament, while still controlling for the diﬀerences in prizes for
a given round across events. Moreover, it allows us to cleanly account for players’ past
exertion (and the hypothesized spillover eﬀect) without concerns about the autocorrelation
o ft h es a m ep l a y e r ’ sp e r f o r m a n c ea n de ﬀort over a single tournament.
In all rounds before the semiﬁnals, the coeﬃcient on the shadow eﬀect () is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant (p-values  005). That is, the weaker the future oppo-
nent (i.e. a larger rank), the greater the probability that the stronger player is selected as
the winner in the current round. The estimated eﬀects for the quarterﬁnals and semiﬁnals
are also positive, although not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels–this may re-
17While our data do not report start and end times for all matches, we can determine the order of play in
some tournaments (e.g. 1,730 out of 10,812 ﬁrst-round matches). Restricting our sample to only those data,
we ﬁnd that, in general, the coeﬃcient on  is larger when the parallel match has been resolved
relative to case where the winner of the parallel match has not been determined. This diﬀerence conforms
to our theory prediction; however, the coeﬃcients are not statistically diﬀerent from each other with these
much smaller samples.
18Note that the ﬁrst and last columns of Table 2 omit estimates for spillover and shadows, respectively–
there is no spillover for players in the ﬁrst round of a tournament and players face no shadow in the ﬁnal
round.
18ﬂect both small sample sizes and limited variation in opponents’ skills at advanced stages
of these tournaments. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients may also be interpreted–we in-
clude mean and standard deviation values of future opponent rank in the table. For a one
standard-deviation increase in future opponent’s rank (decrease in ability), we estimate that
the probability that the stronger player wins in the current round increases by 2.0 to 5.7
percentage points. Given that the average probability that the stronger player wins is ap-
proximately 65%, on average, the shadow eﬀect represents a 5% increase in the probability
of winning.
Coeﬃcient estimates for the two spillover variables take on predicted signs and, in gen-
eral, are statistically signiﬁcant–more previous games for the stronger player decreases the
probability he wins in the current match, while in general more previous games for the weaker
player increases the chance that the stronger player wins. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients
suggest that, on average, a one standard-deviation increase in the number of previous games
is associated with a 10 and 4 percentage point decline in the probability of winning in the
current match for the stronger and weaker player, respectively. For the stronger player in
an average match, this represents a 15% decline in the probability of winning; for weaker
players, this reﬂects a 11% decline in success.
The history of the stronger player appears to drive his current success more than the
history of his opponent–from expression (11) of our model, we expect the stronger player
to be more adversely aﬀected than the weaker player for a given increase in spillover. That
is, we predict that more negative spillover will reduce the likelihood that the stronger player
is selected as the winner. Indeed, in the data, the eﬀect of previous games played by the
stronger player is often larger than the eﬀect of the weaker player’s previous games. T-tests
comparing the magnitude of the spillover estimates ( : 3 = −4) reject equality in the
2nd round, 4th round, quarter- and semi-ﬁnals (p-values  005). We cannot reject the null
of equal eﬀects in the ﬁnal round, perhaps because players tend to be relatively well-matched
in terms of ability.
Comparing across rounds, the eﬀects of spillover from both stronger and weaker players’
histories are smaller in the ﬁnal periods of tournaments relative to early rounds. This may
be because many events provides additional rest periods for players between the later rounds
of play, while early-round schedules often have players competing on consecutive days.
As expected, the coeﬃcient on skill disparity in the current match is also positive and
statistically signiﬁcant (p-value  001), indicating that increased heterogeneity between the
players increases the probability that the stronger player wins.
We estimate, but do not report, results for regression (10) using ATP points as a measure
of player skill. Estimates are qualitatively similar to results using ATP rankings.
193.2 Underdog Advantage
Rosen (1986) predicts that the weaker competitor’s likelihood of success should always be
higher in the ﬁnal round relative to the probability that he wins earlier in an elimination
tournament. Our proposition 4 provides a critical caveat, requiring that the second-place
p r i z eb es u ﬃciently large relative to the gap between ﬁrst and second-place prizes in order
to induce an underdog advantage.
In the ATP match data, the weaker competitor (underdog) wins 34.1% of the matches
in ﬁnal rounds and 32.6% of matches in earlier rounds. However, this diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. For robustness, we also ran a comparison
while controlling for player skill and tournament-level heterogeneities. Again, we failed to
ﬁnd statistically-signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the weaker players’ probability of winning in
ﬁnal and non-ﬁnal rounds. Although not conclusive, our analysis suggests that the losing
prizes may not be suﬃciently large (relative to the winning prizes) to induce an underdog
advantage in the ﬁnal round.
4 Betting Markets, Spillover and Shadows
While spillover and shadow eﬀects have been relatively understudied in the literature, in
this section, we explore whether active markets already recognize these dynamics of multi-
stage competition. Indeed, by examining data from professional betting markets, we ﬁnd
compelling evidence that subtle spillover and shadow eﬀects have been incorporated into
prices.
The eﬃciency of prediction and betting markets has been studied extensively in the
literature; for examples, see the survey by Vaughn Williams (1999). Prediction markets are
founded on the argument that by aggregating information, competitive markets should result
in prices that reﬂect all available information (Fama 1970). Therefore, driven by aggregated
information and expectations, prediction market prices may oﬀer good forecasts of actual
outcomes (Spann and Skeira 2003).
Similarly, betting odds reﬂect bookmakers’ predictions of future outcomes. Betting odds
may change as new public or private information becomes available to the bookmaker and
with changes in the volume of bets that may be driven by individual bettors’ private infor-
mation. As with formal prediction markets, we might expect betting odds to provide good
forecasts.
Spann and Skeira (2008) compare forecasts from prediction markets and betting odds
using data for German premier soccer league matches. They ﬁnd that prediction markets
20and betting odds provide equally accurate forecasts. This result seems reasonable, since
betting companies with inaccurate and ineﬃcient odds should not survive.
To examine whether betting markets incorporate information about the eﬀects of shadow
and spillover, we estimate a regression similar to equation (10) Now, instead of a binary
indicator of the actual outcome, the dependent variable is the probability that the stronger
player wins the match as implied by betting markets.
Our data include closing odds from professional bookmakers for pre-match betting.19
Woodland and Woodland (1999) note that bookmakers adjust odds based on the volume of
bets, making the odds available as the betting market closes particularly rich in information.
In our analysis, we use the median of the available odds data since the data from no single ﬁrm
covered all matches.20 Overall, there was little variation between odds posted by diﬀerent
bookmakers for the same match, perhaps because participants in tennis betting markets tend
to be specialists and there is little casual betting (Forrest and McHale 2007). 21
The accuracy of odds market predictions suggests that information beyond simple rank-
ings are being priced in the market. Between 2001 and 2010, predictions from the market
are correct for 69% of the 25,633 matches for which betting data are available. Given that
t h es t r o n g e rp l a y e ra c t u a l l yw i n si n6 5 %o fm a t c h e s ,o n em i g h tn o tb es u r p r i s e db yt h i s
accuracy if the market always predicted that the stronger player wins. However, in 18% of
the matches, the betting odds imply that the weaker player is expected to win. Interest-
ingly, these market predictions are accurate nearly 63% of the time. That is, these betting
markets do almost as well predicting an upset as they do predicting a win by the stronger
player. This is particularly notable since a naive assessment of the ATP rankings in these
matches might suggest that the odds are still solidly against the weaker player–on average,
t h ew e a k e rp l a y e r ’ sr a n ki s2 . 1t i m e sh i g h e r( w o r s e )t h a nh i so p p o n e n t .
Results: Table 3
Table 3 reports results for round-level regressions where the dependent variable is the
probability that the stronger player wins as implied by the betting market. Overall, coeﬃ-
cient estimates suggest that the betting predictions incorporate information about players’
past and expected future competition.
19Data from 11 betting ﬁrms (Bet365, Bet&Win, Centrebet, Expekt, Ladbrokes, Gamebookers, Inter-
wetten, Pinnacles, Sportingbet, Stan James, and Unibet) are included in our main dataset obtained from
www.tennis-data.co.uk. Several betting ﬁrms also oﬀer in-play betting, but we focus our analysis on pre-
match bets only.
20We calculate the probability odds from the decimal odds in the original data. Probability odds are
1/(decimal odds-1)
21A positive long-shot bias–where the market undervalues the true favorite and overvalues the long-
shot–has been documented in tennis odds by Forrest and McHale (2007). However, the authors ﬁnd this
small bias is consistent over a broad range of match-ups. In contrast to some markets, they do not ﬁnd any
range with a negative long-shot bias.
21Coeﬃcient estimates for the eﬀect of a stronger future opponent are positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant for all rounds except for the shadow of the ﬁnal round on the semiﬁnals
(p-values range from  001 to 01). It is not surprising that we do not identify the eﬀect
of the shadow of the ﬁnal on the semiﬁnal, given the compressed distribution of skill at the
end of the tournament.
Since the betting market closes only at the start of the match (and after the end of
earlier rounds), players’ past exertion information is readily available. Indeed, coeﬃcient
estimates for the stronger and weaker players’ previous number of games are statistically
signiﬁcant (p-values  001) and take on the expected signs. More previous games played by
the stronger player is associated with a decrease in expectations of his success, while more
previous games played by the weaker player is associated with an increase in expectations
that the stronger player wins. As in Section 3.1 and as predicted by theory, the magnitude
of these coeﬃcients suggests that stronger players are more adversely aﬀected by a given
level of spillover relative to weaker players.
Greater heterogeneity in players’ abilities may increase the market’s expectation that the
stronger player wins–the coeﬃcient on rank ratio is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in
all rounds (p-values  001).
Overall, we ﬁnd strong evidence that prices in tennis betting markets reﬂect both the
shadow and spillover eﬀects predicted by our model. Interestingly, we again ﬁnd no evidence
of an underdog advantage–higher predicted odds for the weaker player in the ﬁnal relative
to earlier rounds–in the betting data.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we explore a class of contests we call “sequentially-resolved elimination tour-
naments.” We present a two-stage, match-pair tournament model that provides two sharp
results: (a) a shadow eﬀect of future competition–the weaker the expected competitor in
the ﬁnal stage, the greater the probability that the stronger player is selected as the winner
in the ﬁrst match; (b) an eﬀort spillover eﬀect–increased negative (positive) spillover de-
creases (increases) the probability that the stronger player wins in the ﬁnal stage. We also
identify a noise eﬀect, whereby increasing noise around eﬀort reduces the probability that
the stronger player wins in either stage, and a prize spread eﬀect, whereby increasing stakes
improves the stronger player’s probability of success in both stages. We provide an analysis
of the underdog advantage suggesting that its presence depends on the distribution of prizes.
We test our two main theoretical hypotheses using data from professional tennis matches.
We ﬁnd evidence of a substantial shadow eﬀect, where a weaker future competitor increases
22the probability that the stronger player wins the current match. We also identify a negative
spillover eﬀect in tennis tournaments–more eﬀort exertion in the previous rounds is asso-
ciated with signiﬁcantly less success in the current round. We do not ﬁnd support for an
underdog advantage in the ﬁnal tournament stage, suggesting that the prize conditions for
this hypothesized phenomenon may not be satisﬁed in the data. Unfortunately, these data
do not allow us to test our secondary theoretical results–in tennis, the plausible measures
of noisiness (best-of-three vs. best-of-ﬁve matches) and the steepness of the prize distrib-
ution are highly correlated and thus the eﬀects cannot be identiﬁed cleanly. However, our
theoretical model provides clear noise- and prize-related predictions.
In a supplemental analysis, we use probability odds data from bookmakers to show that
betting markets recognize and price in the spillover and shadow eﬀects.
5.1 Discussion
Our ﬁndings have implications in terms of the structure of elimination tournaments. Tour-
naments are often designed to identify high-ability candidates in environments where the
contest organizer cannot readily observe innate talent. Our results suggest ways by which a
contest designer can improve the likelihood that the strongest candidate succeeds. Limiting
negative spillover by allowing competitors opportunities to refresh their resources between
stages increases the probability that the stronger type wins. Firms may also want to encour-
age positive spillover through learning. For example, in an innovation contest, ﬁrms should
be given adequate time between stages to raise additional funds and pursue more advanced
technology improvements. Similarly, a ﬁrm may wish to institute a “work-life balance” pro-
gram that promotes employee wellness, discourages career-related burnout, and improves the
probability that the ﬁrm’s labor tournament promotes the strongest workers.
Contest organizers may also wish to avoid “noisy” competition where the eﬀort-to-output
technology is less precise; for example, a larger panel of decision-makers in innovation, design
or personnel tournaments may yield more discriminating selection.
Higher powered prizes also enhance selection across stages–large prize spreads, as well
as small loser prizes, will reduce the chance of selecting the lower-ability candidate.
In contrast, if a contest designer is concerned with the unevenness of competition, it
can design a more balanced contest with more negative spillover, noisier eﬀort-to-output
activities, and a ﬂatter prize structure.
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6.1 Conditions for (·)


























where  ≡ [0 (·)]
−1  These conditions ensure that (·) ∈ (01) for both stages in equilibrium.
Depending on the model parameters, one condition will determine the upper bound of (·)
and the other condition will determine the lower bound.
6.2 Combined Shadow and Spillover Eﬀects
Our main analysis considers separately the eﬀects of eﬀort spillover and the shadow of future
competition. Here, we present an analysis when both eﬀects are at play. Combining the
eﬀects does not change the general predictions of the previous analysis–spillover continues
to even the playing ﬁeld, while weaker future competition does the opposite.
6.2.1 Spillover and Shadow - Final Stage
W eb e g i nw i t ht h eﬁnal stage and ﬁx players’ abilities across the stages. For illustration
purposes and computational ease, we again assume quadratic costs. Our ﬁrst order condition






where  (·) reﬂects the degree of spillover from the previous stage and is an increasing func-
tion of ﬁrst stage eﬀort .A se x p e c t e d ,g r e a t e rﬁrst-stage eﬀort results in lower equilibrium
eﬀort in the ﬁnal stage. Further, this eﬀect is ampliﬁed for the stronger type since 1  2







Therefore, a given level of spillover (1 = 2 = ) reduces the disparity between participants’







276.2.2 Spillover and Shadow - First Stage






















































































2 | {z }
spillover eﬀect
(11)
With no spillover ( =1 ) the left term is precisely the shadow eﬀect we described in
Section (12). The right term reﬂects spillover. When  =1  this spillover term is greater
for the stronger player and, thus, the stronger player reduces his eﬀort more than the lesser
player (since (·) ≥ 1
2 and 1  2). Since the stronger player exerts more equilibrium
eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage, he will necessarily suﬀer more spillover in the ﬁnal stage (assuming
p l a y e r sf a c eac o m m o n() function). Thus, spillover has the eﬀect of evening the playing
ﬁe l di nb o t hs t a g e s .T h a ti s ,ceteris paribus, spillover increases the chance of an upset.
6.3 Proofs
Proposition 3: With quadratic costs, for a given prize spread increase, the stronger player
is even more likely to be selected as the winner in either stage.
Proof. Let player 1 be the stronger player and player 2 be the weaker player so that 1  2
T h er e s u l tf o rt h eﬁnal stage eﬀort follows immediately from equation (6) To compare the
eﬀect of changing the prize spread ∆ on players’ ﬁrst stage equilibrium eﬀorts, we consider









































































The ﬁnal inequality is always met, since 1  2 by assumption. Therefore, the stronger
player increases his eﬀort more than the weaker player for a given increase in ∆ Conse-
quently, this increased eﬀort disparity increases the probability that the stronger player wins
in the either stage.
Proposition 4: 1 (∗
1 ∗
3 (3))  1(∗
1∗








 W i t has u ﬃciently large second place prize relative to the ﬁrst place prize, the
probability that the weaker player wins in the ﬁnal stage (and thus is selected as the overall
tournament winner) is greater than the probability that he wins in the ﬁrst stage, holding
opponent skill constant.
Proof. Proposition 4 identiﬁes an underdog advantage in the ﬁnal stage–that is, the weaker
player has a greater probability of winning in the ﬁnal stage over the ﬁrst stage. This occurs



















































Assume that the skill level of player 1’s opponents in the ﬁrst and ﬁnal stages are equal,
2 = 3
We must show that ˜ 2  ∆ This will prove the inequality in expression (12) since the
diﬀerence in the pairs of  functions is increasing in that stage’s prize and we know that
29˜ 1  ˜ 2
˜ 2  ∆
(1 − (·))∆ − 2 (2)+  ∆
  (·)∆ + 2 (2)







The ﬁnal inequality provides a suﬃcient condition for an underdog advantage. Note that
when we ﬁx ∆ the value of the RHS of the inequality is also ﬁxed. Then, holding ∆
ﬁxed we can ﬁnd some   0 that satisﬁes the inequality. However, recall that  must
be less than 1; yet,  is increasing in  To see that some values satisfy  ≤ 1,
we allow the prize levels to converge:  →  In this case, as ∆ → 0 the RHS of the
inequality approaches 0 and the inequality is then easily satisﬁed since   0
For a simple example, set: 1 =0 7; 2 =1 ; =0 1; ∆ =1 ; =1 5 With quadratic
costs, our inequality fails–i.e., the weaker player is even less likely to win in the ﬁnal stage.
However, with  =0 5, the weaker player is more likely to win in the ﬁnal stage. Thus,
given a large enough second-place prize relative to the ﬁrst-place prize, the weaker player is
more likely to win against the same opponent in the ﬁnal stage.
6.4 A General Distribution Case
6.4.1 Final Stage
The model in the body of the paper presents results when the noise in players’ output is
distributed uniformly; recall that, in section (1) we deﬁne  = 3 − 1 and assume that






 In fact, similar results can be derived for
any unimodal and symmetric distribution (•) with mean zero. For illustrative purposes,
let players face quadratic costs.23 Again assume that the ﬁrst-stage matches are resolved
sequentially; players 1 and 2 know that player 3 won his parallel match to advance to the
ﬁnal stage.
Player 1’s payoﬀ function for the ﬁnal stage can be written as
1 = (1 − 3)∆ − 1 (1)
2 + 
23More generally, players can face any cost function of the form .




0 (1 − 3)∆ − 211 =0
Similarly, player 3’s ﬁrst order condition is

0 (3 − 1)∆ − 233 =0
Since (·) is symmetric about its mean, it follows that 0 (1 − 3)=0 (3 − 1).T h i s














Although changes in the prize spread or the noise around players’ output aﬀect equilib-
rium eﬀort, the ratio of players’ eﬀorts is constant. It follows, for example, that an increase
in the prize spread that leads to higher equilibrium eﬀort from both competitors will nec-
essarily increase the absolute spread between players’ eﬀorts. In turn, this increases the
probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage since his probability of win-
ning is (1 − 3). In contrast, as equilibrium eﬀort falls–for example, from the adverse
eﬀects of negative spillover–the absolute spread between players’ eﬀorts decreases. Here,
the probability that the stronger player wins declines with equilibrium eﬀort levels.
Since (•) can be any unimodal symmetric distribution, the impact of changes in the
variance of (•) depends on the exact distribution and its parameters. The top panel of
Figure A1 provides an illustration: consider two normal distributions centered at zero with
standard deviations of 1 and 2, respectively.
First consider region A. When the players are relatively similar in ability and thus choose
similar equilibrium eﬀorts, reducing the variance means a “thickening” of the density. This
provides greater incentives for both players, as the marginal return to eﬀort is greater.
Therefore, when players are similar in ability, the probability that the stronger player wins
increases as the variance decreases.
Now consider region B where the ability diﬀerence between players is substantial and
decreased variance means a “thinning” of the density. This weakens incentives for both
players, as the marginal return to eﬀort is reduced. Therefore, in this region, decreased
variance reduces the probability that the stronger player wins.
316.4.2 First Stage Eﬀort and Shadow Eﬀect
Next, we consider players’ eﬀort choices in the ﬁrst stage of competition. Here, player 1 faces
a similar payoﬀ function to his ﬁnal-stage problem, but considers his continuation value e 1
instead of the prize spread ∆ This yields the following ﬁrst order condition:

0 (1 − 2) e 1 − 121 =0
To study the impact of the ability of the future competitor on ﬁrst-stage outcomes, we
consider the case where the player 3 becomes a weaker opponent (i.e., 3 increases). The
following two conditions are suﬃcient for player 1 to weakly increase his eﬀort relative to
his current opponent’s eﬀort choice and thus improve his probability of winning in the ﬁrst
stage: (a) 0 (∗
1 − ∗
3) ≥ 0 (∗
2 − ∗
3) and (b) 
3
e 1 ≥ 
3
e 2 In the following sections, we
describe when each of these conditions holds.
Condition (a): 0 (∗
1 − ∗
3) ≥ 0 (∗
2 − ∗
3) When noise is distributed uniformly, 0 (1 − 3)=
0 (2 − 3) and condition (a) is always met. For more general distributions, we must ana-
lyze this condition over several cases. Consider a contest where the diﬀerence in players’
additive noise terms, is drawn from a normal distribution, illustrated below in the bottom
panel of Figure A1. Since the ordering of players’ eﬀorts is critical for the analysis, we outline
three cases.
Ordering 1) When ∗
3  ∗
2  ∗
1 ,p l a y e r s1a n d2e x p e c tt of a c eaf u t u r eo p p o n e n t
w h oi sw e a k e rt h a nb o t ho ft h e m .F o re x a m p l e ,i nt h eﬁgure below, suppose that ∗
1−∗
3 lies
at C and ∗
2 − ∗
3 lies between B and C. Here, we violate condition (a) since 0 (1 − 3) 
0 (2 − 3) If player 1 and 2 are similar enough in ability, the current increase in player
1’s eﬀort can still be greater despite a smaller change in continuation value since 1  2
That is, player 1 is more sensitive to a change in continuation value so a smaller change in
the value can still yield a greater change in eﬀort for player 1.
Ordering 2) When ∗
2  ∗
1  ∗
3, the future opponent is always stronger than both
current players. In this case, it is unambiguous that the stronger player has a greater
increase of eﬀort since now ∗
1 −∗
3 lies say between A and B and ∗
2 −∗
3 to the left of that.
This means 0 (1 − 3)  0 (2 − 3)
Ordering 3) When ∗
2  ∗
3  ∗
1 t h ef u t u r eo p p o n e n ti ss t r o n g e rt h a np l a y e r2b u t









The ﬁrst inequality leads to a violation of condition (a), since 0 (1 − 3)  0 (2 − 3);in
contrast, condition (a) is satisﬁed for the second inequality. That is, condition (a) is satisﬁed
when ∗
1 − ∗
3 falls between B and C and ∗
2 − ∗
3 falls below A.
32Overall, we ﬁnd that the condition is satisﬁed whenever the future opponent is suﬃciently
strong. That is, we ﬁnd the shadow eﬀect of future competition as long as the future opponent
is suﬃciently more skilled than the weaker player in the current match.
Assuming that the spreads between players’ abilities are similar across parallel matches,
we will observe most often the case where the expect future opponent is similar in ability to
the stronger current player. In the event that the weaker player does win the parallel match,
the marginal returns to eﬀort may be reversed and the current weaker player may actually
increase his eﬀort more than his stronger opponent. However, in our empirical analysis, these
less frequent cases simply work against ﬁnding a positive shadow eﬀect.
Condition (b): 
3
e 1 ≥ 
3
e 2 To consider the second condition, recall that player 1’s
ﬁnal stage equilibrium payoﬀ is
1 = e 1 = (1 − 3)∆ − 1 (1)
2 + 
The following expression describes how ﬁnal stage proﬁt changes as a function of player


















































































3 e 1 ≥ 
3 e 2 we want to show ∗
11 ≥ ∗























3) is met, then ∗
11 ≥ ∗
22 and 
3 e 1 ≥ 





is necessary and suﬃcient for meeting condition (b). In other words, the shadow eﬀect is a
function of both the distribution of noise and players’ skill disparity.
336.5 Spillover
In the section (13) we describe negative spillover as increasing players’ eﬀective cost types.
Assume that two players experience the same level of exertion in the ﬁrst stage, leading to
t h es a m ep r o p o r t i o n a li n c r e a s ei nc o s tt y p e si nt h eﬁnal stage. The ratio of their eﬀorts
remains unchanged; however, ﬁnal stage eﬀorts are lower and thus the absolute spread in
eﬀorts is smaller and the stronger player is less likely to win the match. Therefore, as we
found in the uniform case, spillover evens the playing ﬁeld.
6.6 Underdog Advantage
An underdog advantage still exists with a more general noise distribution when the second
prize is suﬃciently large relative to the prize spread. This can be shown by holding ∆ ﬁxed
while increasing . Both players’ continuation values increase equally in the ﬁrst stage;
however, to maintain the ratio of equilibrium eﬀorts, the stronger player must increase his
eﬀort more than the weaker player. Final stage eﬀorts are unaﬀected by changes in  since
the second prize does not enter into players’ ﬁnal stage ﬁrst order conditions. Hence, with a
suﬃciently large , the weaker player is more likely to win in the ﬁnal stage relative to his
chances in the ﬁrst stage.
34source: ATPworldtour.com
Figure 1 - Example Draw from 2007 Davidoff Swiss Indoors in BaselAll Rounds 1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 4th Round Quarterfinals Semifinals The Final
# of Matches Played 28370 14497 7237 1897 433 2461 1230 615
Average # of games played 23.1 21.6 24.6 26.7 31.7 23.3 23.5 25.3
(10.4) (11.4) (8.6) (10.1) (11.5) (7.7) (7.6) (8.7)
Average Rank of Winner 58.6 71.7 52.5 32.5 21.5 43.8 37.0 29.7
(73.2) (83.4) (61.1) (55.0) (57.3) (53.4) (49.6) (39.2)
Average Rank of Loser 95.5 119.7 90.9 54.9 39.9 62.0 50.5 43.9
(121.0) (147.7) (97.0) (64.4) (58.1) (65.3) (56.3) (55.2)
Average Rank Ratio 6.8 5.7 8.2 8.9 10.4 6.7 6.6 6.7
(Worse / Better by Rank) (20.9) (21.5) (20.6) (18.9) (20.1) (24.3) (12.8) (13.4)
Table 1 - Summary Statistics for ATP World Tour Events January 2001 to May 2010
Note:  Data contain player and performance information for 615 tournaments. Values in parentheses are standard deviations. Dependent Variable: Stronger Player Wins in Current Period (0 or 1)
Expected Future 0.079% *** 0.084% *** 0.071% *** 0.165% ** 0.150% *** 0.421% *** 0.057% 0.077%
Opponent Rank (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Stronger Player's -0.350% *** -0.435% *** -0.442% *** -0.513% *** -0.581% * -0.310% *** -0.158% *** -0.132% **
Previous Games (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0031) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Weaker Player's 0.219% ** 0.175% * 0.110% 0.094% 0.163% 0.139% * 0.062% * 0.087% *
Previous Games (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Current Rank Ratio  0.161% *** 0.281% *** 0.194% *** 0.340% *** 0.265% *** 0.338% *** 0.089% ** 0.543% *** 0.363%
(Worse / Better Rank) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0032)
# of observations 12575 3759 4891 858 1461 432 2450 1220 615
Table 2 - Combined Spillover and Shadow Effects
The Final 
(no shadow)
2nd on 1st 
Round
3rd on 2nd 
Round 
Qfinals on 2nd 
Round
4th on 3rd 
Round
Qfinals on 3rd 




Notes: "Expected Future Opponent Rank" is the rank of the stronger player in the parallel event. That is, it is the rank of the stronger of the potential 
opponents in the next round. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-values of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. Regressions include tournament-level fixed effects. Dependent Variable: Implied Probability the Stronger Player Wins (%)
Expected Future 0.083% *** 0.095% *** 0.041% *** 0.075% *** 0.075% *** 0.054% 0.021% * 0.020%
Opponent Rank (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Stronger Player's -0.312% *** -0.340% *** -0.363% *** -0.369% *** -0.508% *** -0.291% *** -0.102% *** -0.094% ***
Previous Games (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Weaker Player's 0.116% *** 0.114% *** 0.084% *** 0.091% *** 0.116% 0.069% *** 0.036% *** 0.053% ***
Previous Games (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Current Rank Ratio  0.147% *** 0.249% *** 0.178% *** 0.318% *** 0.248% *** 0.329% *** 0.117% 0.415% *** 0.338% ***
(Worse / Better Rank) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009)
# of observations 11983 3617 4586 834 1414 425 2339 1169 591
The Final (no 
shadow)
Table 3 - Predicting Betting Probability Odds by Spillovers and Shadows (Rankings)
2nd on 1st 
Round




4th on 3rd 
Round
Qfinals on 3rd 




Notes: "Expected Future Opponent Rank" is the rank of the stronger player in the parallel event. That is, it is the rank of the stronger of the potential 
opponents in the next round. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-values of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. Regressions include tournament-level fixed effects. Figure A1:  Example Densities of Joint Noise  - Normal Distribution
Panel 2: Normal Distribution of Joint Noise
Panel 1: Return to Effort as a Function of Different "Noise Levels"
Lessnoise￿i.e., SD of 1￿
Region B Region B
Region A
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